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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the application of Public Private Partnership (PPP) in Italy. The paper would like to study 
weakness and strength of these partnerships. This is a descriptive paper based on secondary data. The research defines and 
describes the importance of PPPs in a period of financial difficulties for national and local governments, with a special focus on 
Italy experiences. Partnership between public and private haven’t a large diffusion in Italy and don’t concern big or national 
structure but local structure like cemeteries, local stadium for swimming competition, and little harbor for private ships.  PPPs 
in Italy context require important reflections because there isn’t a high level of collaboration between private and public actors, 
for many reasons. For example, one of the main causes is represented by a very low level of preparation of local offices and the 
consequent difficulties of public local actor to manage the partnership. 
1. Introduction 
“Public-Private Partnership (PPPs) combines the resource of government with those of private agents (business 
or not-for-profit bodies) in order to deliver social goals” (Skelcher, 2005: 347). PPPs give rise to a series of 
ideological and managerial choices, linked to (Linder and Rosenau, 2000): 
- the relationship between private actors and state, 
- the extent to which business and not-for-profits should substitute for government, and 
- the costs and benefits of different public-private solutions. 
«Some regard PPPs as “the” answer to many economic growth and development problems facing state and local 
governments today, while others express varying degrees of skepticism about their attractiveness and effectiveness. 
Nonetheless, most seem to agree that PPPs will likely remain an important approach to designing and 
implementing economic development strategies» (Mullin, 2002). 
While PPPs are not new to public government economic development scene, academic interest in their use and 
effectiveness as economic development tools appears to have increased in the past decades.  
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History indicates that there has always been some degree of cooperation between the public sector and the 
private sector (Wettenhall, 2003). The stories of private contracting in the public sphere are numerous:  
- In Imperial China around the time of birth of Christ, public government and private enterprises were both 
involved in salt and iron mining, with movement between them (Gernet, 1982: 140) 
- The mixing of public and private initiatives was vital to England’ rise as a major sea power; 82 percent of 
Sir Francis Drake’s fleet, which successfully conquered the Spanish Armada in 1588, were private contractors to 
the Admiralty; 
- Enterprise “played no small part in the launching of the East India Company and the financing of the 
Virginia Plantation” (Andrews, 196: 230) ; 
- Down to 1700 The Spanish empire was built on such private-public mixes, in fact “Spanish government 
relied principally on private contractors to supply both   soldiers and ships” (Wettenhall, 2005: 28) ; 
- When the great Sidney Harbor Bridge was built in the early 1930s common sense ensured that the central 
span was built under contract by one of the world’s leading private bridge construction firms; the massive 
approaches were, however, constructed by the New South Ways Public Works Department (Wettenhall, 2005: 33) 
; 
- During the 1970s, the French and British governments tried but failed to achieve an agreement on public 
construction and management of a Channel tunnel. This was one of the main reasons why the tunnel instead came 
to be a privately financed and operated construction;  
- There is a massive public-private mixing also in the planning and management of the events such as 
international exhibitions and trade fairs and the Olympic Games; 
- Tony Blair government, for example report a commitment of £35.5 billion by the U.K. government for 
563 private finance initiative (PFI) deals (Edwards et al., 2004). 
This paper is structured as follows. First, we define the research methodology (aims, value and limitations). 
Second, starting from Hodge and Greve (2007) paper, we realize a literature review on this topic. Third, we define 
different models and characteristics of each category. After then we present PPPs in Italy with a specific focus on 
trends and. The article ends with a brief discussion on evaluation observations and implications.  
2. Research Methodology 
2.1. Aims and research value 
This research is based on secondary data (UNITED NATIONS, 2011; Infopieffe, 2012) and aims to describe the 
phenomenon of PPPs in Italy. With different scholars (Miranda and Lerner, 1995; Linder and Rosenau, 2000; 
Capasso, 2002) supporting that PPPs can be a tool to develop systemic competitiveness in a specific area, this 
paper represents an overview of the state of Public-Private Partnership in Italy. The research’s objectives are: 
(1) To describe different PPPs models,  
(2) To analyze and understand the role of PPPs in Italy. 
The research provides a context of prescriptive actions and processes, while offering also a valuable theoretical 
basis for empirical development and practical application.  
Research limitations and further research 
This is a descriptive paper. Its limitations are a consequence of its real nature i.e. the fact that it is a secondary 
data based research and a largely conceptual one. Consequently, further research should firstly empirically test this 
research’s findings. 
 
3. Literature review  
Scientific (Linder and Rosenau, 2000; Van Ham and Koppenjan, 2001; Capasso, 2002; Skelcher, 2005; Hodge 
and Greve, 2007; Amatucci, 2009, 2010) and institutional (World Bank, 2003; European Commission, 2004; 
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OECD, 2008; united Nations, 2011) literature on the PPP has increased significantly over the years, to confirm a 
growing interest on this particular theme . 
The European Commission (2004), for example, distinguishes two types of PPP: 
• PPPs of a purely contractual nature, where the partnership is based solely on contractual links and may 
fall within the scope of European Directives on public procurement; 
• PPPs of an institutional nature. These PPPs involve cooperation within a distinct entity and may lead to 
the creation of an ad hoc entity held jointly by the public sector and the private sector or the control of a public 
entity by a private operator. 
According to World Bank (2003), «PPP refers to arrangements, typically medium to long term, between the 
public and private sectors whereby part of the services or works that fall under the responsibilities of the public 
sector are provided by the private sector, with clear agreement on shared objectives for delivery of public 
infrastructure and/or public services». 
OECD (2008) defines «PPP as a long term agreement between the government and a private partner where the 
service delivery objectives of the government are aligned with the profit objectives of the private partner». 
However, scholars have been divided in their thinking about PPPs. Some see it a new governance tool that will 
replace the traditional method of contracting for public services through competitive tendering. Others see PPPs as 
a new expression in the language of public management, one intend to include older, established procedures of 
involvement of private organizations in the delivery of public services (Linder, 1999). Yet others view PPPs as a 
new way to handle infrastructure projects, such as building tunnels and renewing harbors. 
Hodge and Greve (2007) argue that «the greatest divide seems to be between researchers who view Public-
Private Partnerships as a toll of governance and those who think it is a “language game” (Teisman and Klijn, 2001; 
2002)» (Hodge and Greve, 2007: 546). These authors examine PPPs with a double point of view:  
- as Organizational and Financial Arrangements,  
- as a language Game. 
 
3.1. PPPs as Organizational and Financial Arrangements 
An important part of scholars sustain that PPPs are established because there are benefit both for private and public 
sectors. Vaillancourt Rosenau (2000) sustains that the public and private sectors have specific qualities, and if 
those values are combined the end results will be better for all. Cooperation and risk sharing are the major 
considerations for both sectors in combining these qualities. 
Van Ham and Koppenjan (2001) focalise their attention on cooperation. PPPs are a «Cooperation of some sort of 
durability between public and private actors in which they jointly develop products and services and share risks, 
costs, and resources which are connected with these products»  (Van Ham and Koppenjan, 2001: 598). This 
definition emphasize three important element: 
 cooperation of durability, because collaboration can’t take place only in short terms; 
 risk sharing, because both parties have to bear parts of the risks involved; 
 parts must jointly realize something and both stand to gain from mutual effort. 
PPPs can concern infrastructure projects: «in this sense refers to an arrangement where government states its 
need for capital-intensive, long-lived infrastructure and the desired facility is built using a complex combination of 
government and (mostly) private financing and then operated by a private entity under a long-term franchise, 
contract, or lease» (Savas, 2000: 7). There are different types of arrangements that «include BOT (build-own-
transfer), BOOT (build-own-operate-transfer), as well as so-called sale-and-lease-back arrangements, whereby 
local governments sell their buildings and then rent them back on a 20- or 30-year contract from a financial 
organization» (Hodge and Greve, 2007: 546). 
A wider interpretation of partnership that keeps the organizational aspect but sees it in inter organizational terms 
is to consider policy networks as special arrangements for public – private cooperation. There is a massive 
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literature on policy networks and governance (e.g. Börzel 1998; Kickert et al. 1997; Klijn and Koppenjan 2000; 
Milward and Provan 2000). These scholars emphasize the intermingling and cooperation of public and private 
actors in inter organizational settings. 
On this statement it is possible to define at least two dimensions for PPPs. The first one is a financial dimension 
- «How are public and private actors engaged financially in PPPs?» (Hodge and Greve, 2007: 547) - the second 
one is organizational dimension - «How tightly organized are public actors and private actors?» (Hodge and Greve, 
2007: 547) (Figure 1). 
There are also many other uses for the PPP concept. Public-Private Partnership concept seems to encompass at 
least five families of arrangements (Hodge and Greve, 2007): 
• Institutional cooperation for joint production and risk sharing. For Klijn and Teisman (2005) and Van 
Ham and Koppenjan (2001, 2002) an example of this arrangement is the Netherlands Port Authority; 
• Long-term infrastructure contracts that emphasize tight specification of outputs in long-term legal 
contracts. Many scholars – Ghobadian et al. (2004), Grimsey and Lewis (2004), Berg et al. (2002), 
Osborne (2001), and Perrot and Chatelus (2000) – think that United Kingdom is an example of this 
agreement; 
• Public policy networks in which loose stakeholder relationships are emphasized (Vaillancourt 
Rosenau, 2000); 
• Civil society and community development in which partnership symbolism is adopted for cultural 
change. For Osborne (2001) Hungary and other post communist Nations are an example; 
• Urban renewal and downtown economic development. Bovaird (2004) underline that in the United 
States these measures are pursued. 
It is clear that these PPP families cover a large group of governance typologies. Each of these PPP families also 
has implications different from those of traditional contracting arrangements: «longer-term impacts, a larger 
potential role in infrastructure decision making, bigger financial flows, and greater capacity for risks to be shifted 
to either side of the partnership. And each may have different accountability implications to ensure that this form 
of governance maintains public accountability at a high level» (Hodge and Greve, 2007: 547). 
 
3.2. PPPs as a Language Game 
The alternative view of PPPs is as a language game: in other words PPPs is a game designed to obscure other 
strategies and purposes. One such purpose is privatization and the encouragement of private providers to supply 
public services at the expense of public organizations themselves. Privatization proponent Savas (2000) openly 
admits in his book that “contracting out” and “privatization” are expressions that generate opposition quickly and 
that expressions such as “alternative delivery systems” and now “public – private partnerships” invite more people 
and organizations to join the debate and enable private organizations to get a market share of public service 
provision. As a result many scholars (Teisman and Klijn, 2002; Linder, 1999 and Savas, 2000), agree that the use 
of the term public – private partnerships must be seen in relation to previoussuch as “contracting out” and 
“privatization”. 
Viewed from this perspective, researchers should be careful about how they approach the empirical analysis of 
PPPs. Analyzing the language game and how governments deliberately change discourse in the pursuit of getting 
policy votes from more supporters has always been central to public policy analysis, and a number of researchers 
have dealt with the language of public management reform and how new practices are introduced through the 
construction of meaning (Clark and Newman, 1997). «There is no doubt that PPPs have become a favorite 
expression when describing new institutional arrangements for governments» (Hodge and Greve, 2007: 547-548). 
The British Blair government is famous for putting an emphasis on PPPs. The language question is an issue of 
some significance. If partnerships are characterized historically to encompass the breadth of past government – 
business relationships, they bring with them the aura of almost all economic wealth-creating activities. Though 
advocates are quick to be associated with such positive outcomes, they are also quick to selectively carve out what 
today constitutes the PPP policy arena in local jurisdictions. Of course, language games are at the heart of all 
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public policy debates. But the pursuit of such language games in the PPP arena can lead, for example, to the 
amusing situation in which two governments on opposite sides of the globe see PFI-type PPPs in opposite ways. 
Consider the long-term infrastructure contract family of PPPs exemplified in the United Kingdom’s family PFI 
policy. In Victoria, Australia, such PPPs are argued to have nothing to do with privatization and are vigorously 
separated from this policy. In the United Kingdom, however, the Treasury sees the two as inherently connected 
and speaks of PPPs as directly equivalent to privatization (Her Majesty’s Treasury, 2003). In other words, the same 
PPP phenomenon is thus being framed in two opposite ways for local political gain.  
So, PPPs are a big container of many families. «It is not a simple matter to judge whether PPPs are (1) the next 
chapter in the privatization story; (2) another promise in our ongoing attempts to better define and measure public 
sector service performance; (3) a renewed support scheme for boosting business in difficult times; or (4) a 
language game camouflaging the next frontier of conquering transaction merchants, legal advisors, and merchant 
bankers pursuing fat commissions» (Hodge and Greve, 2007: 548) 
 
4. PPPs models 
A wide spectrum of PPP models has emerged. These models vary mainly by:  
• Ownership of capital assets;  
• Responsibility for investment;  
• Assumption of risks; and  
• Duration of contract.   
 The PPP models can be classified into five broad categories in order of generally (but not always) increased 
involvement and assumption of risks by the private sector. The five broad categories are (Figure 2):  
• Supply and management contracts;  
• Turnkey contracts; 
• Affermage/Lease; 
• Concessions; 
• Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and Private ownership. 
It’s possible to define different variants for each model (Figure 3). 
 
4.1. Supply and management contracts 
A management contract is a contractual agreement for the management of a part or whole of a public enterprise by 
the private sector. Management contracts allow private sector skills to be brought into service design and delivery, 
operational control, labor management and equipment procurement. However, the public sector retains the 
ownership of facility and equipment. The private sector is assigned specified responsibilities concerning a service. 
For private sector there isn’t a commercial risk. The private contractor is paid a fee to manage and operate services. 
Usually, the contract period is short (three-five years, normally). But the period may be longer for large and 
complex operational facilities such as a port or an airport.  
4.2. Turnkey 
Turnkey is a traditional public sector procurement model for infrastructure facilities. Generally, a private 
contractor is selected through a bidding process. The private contractor designs and builds a facility for a fixed fee 
which is one of the key criteria in selecting the winning proposal. In this case contractor assumes risks involved in 
the design and construction phases. The scale of investment by the private sector is generally low and for a short-
term. In this type of arrangement, there isn’t strong incentive for early completion of the project. This type of 
private sector participation is also known as Design-Build.  
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4.3. Affermage/Lease 
In this category of agreement, the operator (the leaseholder) is responsible for operating and maintaining the 
infrastructure facility (that already exists) and services, but generally the operator is not required to make any large 
investment. However, often this model is applied in combination with other models such as build-rehabilitate-
operate-transfer. In such a case, the contract period is generally much longer and the private sector is required to 
make significant investment. The difference between affermage and a lease is technical. Under a lease, the operator 
retains revenue collected from users of the facility and makes a specified lease fee payment to the contracting 
authority. Under an affermage, the operator and the contracting authority share revenue from consumers. In the 
affermage/lease types of arrangements, the operator takes lease of both infrastructure and equipment from the 
government for an agreed period of time. Generally, the government undertakes investment risks, but operational 
risks are transferred to the operator. However, as part of the lease, some assets also may be transferred on a 
permanent basis for a period, which extends over the economic life of assets. Fixed facilities and land are leased 
out for a longer period than for mobile assets. Land to be developed by the leaseholder is usually transferred for a 
period of 15-30 years.  
4.4. Concessions 
In this form, the government defines and grants specific rights to a private company to build and operate a facility 
for a fixed period of time. The government may maintain the ultimate ownership of the facility and/or right to 
supply the services. In concessions, payments can take place both ways: concessionaire pays to government for the 
concession rights and the government may pay the concessionaire, which it provides under the agreement to meet 
certain specific conditions. Usually, such payments by the government may be necessary to make projects 
commercially viable and/or reduce the level of commercial risk taken by the private sector, particularly in a 
developing or untested PPP market. Typical concession periods range between 5 to 50 years.  
In a Build-Operate-Transfer or BOT type of concession- (and its other variants namely, Build-Transfer-Operate 
(BTO), Build-Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer (BROT), Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT) - the concessionaire makes 
investments and operates the facility for a fixed period of time after which the ownership reverts back to the public 
sector. In a BOT modal, operational and investment risks can be transmitted to the concessionaire. However the 
government has explicit and implicit contingent liabilities that may arise due to loan guarantees and sub-ordinate 
loans provided, and default of a sub-sovereign government and public or private entity on non-guaranteed loans. 
By retaining ultimate ownership, the government controls the policy and can allocate risks to parties that are best 
suited to assume or remove them. The concessionaire’s revenue in a BOT project comes from managing and 
marketing of the user facilities and renting of commercial space where possible. Concessions for BOT projects can 
be structured on either maximum revenue share for a fixed concession period or minimum concession period for a 
fixed revenue share, a combination of both, or only minimum concession period.  
 
4.5. Private Finance Initiative 
In the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) model, the private sector remains responsible for the design, construction 
and operation of an infrastructure facility. It could be possible that public sector unrestraint the right of ownership 
of assets to the private sector. In this model, the public sector purchases infrastructure services from the private 
sector through a long-term agreement. PFI projects, therefore, bear direct financial obligations to the government 
in any event. In addition, explicit and implicit contingent liabilities may also arise due to loan guarantees provided 
to the lenders and default of a public or private entity on non-guaranteed loans. In the PFI model, asset ownership 
at the end of the contract period is generally transferred to the public sector. Setting up of a Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV) may not be always necessary. A PFI contract may be awarded to an existing company. For the 
purpose of financing, the lenders may, however, require the establishment of an SPV. The PFI model also has 
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many variants. In a PFI project, as the same entity builds and operates the services, and is paid for the successful 
supply of services at a pre-defined standard, the SPV-private company has no incentive to reduce the quality or 
quantity of services. This form of contractual agreement reduces the risks of cost overruns during the design and 
construction phases or of choosing an inefficient technology, since the operator’s future earnings depend on 
controlling the costs. The public sector’s main advantages are that lie in the relief from bearing the costs of design 
and construction, the transfer of certain risks to the private sector and the promise of better project design, 
construction and operation. 
 
5. PPPs in Italy: Features, Trends and New Dynamics 
PPPs were introduced into the Italian legislation (framework law regarding public works) in 1998 through the 
so-called Merloni Law. For this reason PPP in Italy is a very recent practice, however from 2002 to 2012 there was 
a significant positive trend in the adoption of PPPs (Figure 4). 
Most of the Italian PPP contracts have been mainly used in sporting facilities, transportations, urban, 
developments (Figure 5 and Figure 6). 
Lombardia, Veneto, Campania and Toscana are principal area of PPPs projects. Particularly Lombardia was the 
region with the largest number of projects (440) followed by Campania, Toscana, Piemonte, Emilia Romagna 
(Figure 7). The remained regions do not exceed 220 numbers of projects. 
On the top list for business volume ranks Veneto (about 2.5 billion euro), followed by Toscana, Campania and 
Lombardia (Figure 8). The remained regions do not exceed 505 million euro. 
Recent data show an increase – in the second quarter 2012 – of demand for projects to be implemented with 
operations of the Public Private Partnership. The driving forces are the basic amenities, sports facilities and 
highways. Overall, the PPP market in Italy, between May and August 2012, is represented by 1086 initiatives, for a 
business volume of approximately € 3.2 billion reported at 595 contracts. Compared to the same period of 2011, 
the PPP market recorded a growth in the number (from 948 to 1,086 contracts; +15%) and the amount (from 2.9 
billion to 3.2 billion, +11%). The growing interest in the operations of the Partnership for Public and Private is 
confirmed by the data on the incidence of this new market, the entire market for public contracts, which in the 
period May-August 2012 amounted to almost 20% share of number of contracts (+2.2% compared to 2011) and 
36% for turnover (3.2 billion € 8.8 billion of total) a higher percentage of 7% compared to the same period of 
2011. 
Initiatives in the areas of essential services have been a total of 307 (compared to 200 the previous year) the 
amount of the alleged 729 million (compared to 594 million), of which 256 to just under 500 million related to 
network infrastructures for the production of electricity (mainly photovoltaic systems), public lighting, for the 
distribution of gas and water and telecommunications, and 39 to 184 million relating to construction operations 
cemetery (there were 31 to less than 100 million in the second quarter 2011). Initiatives in the field of sports 
facilities were 305 (a year were 264), more than a quarter of the total demand in the quarter turned almost 
exclusively held by the municipalities through the procedure of granting of services. Much less numerous are 
economically much more significant interventions in the transport sector, with 1.6 billion (52% of the market) for 4 
races known amount of 15 races in total. Determining the two big tenders in Anas Spa: the management and 
maintenance the A3 Napoli-Salerno of 51.6 km, and the completion of the implementation of all the steps included 
in the agreement signed on 28 July 2009 between the 'Anas Spa and Autostrade Southern Spa, valued at over 799 
million, the construction, management and maintenance of the motorway A21 Piacenza-Cremona-Brescia and 
branch to Fiorenzuola d'Arda (PC) of 88.6 km, including the completion the implementation of all the steps 
included in the agreement signed on November 7, 2007 between the Company and the Highways Anas Spa Centre 
Padane Spa, valued at € 683 million. 
With regard to the economic dimension of the interventions, compared to 2011, there was a general increase of 
the initiatives of between one million and 10 million euro, compared to a decline of tenders for amounts less than 
one million and initiatives amount between 10 and 50 million euro. With regard to the actions of amount exceeding 
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EUR 50 million, the budget has two speeds: it reduces the number of races from 9 to 8 units, but increases the 
amount of 27% (from EUR 1.8 billion to € 2.2 billion) thanks to two big races Anas total value of approximately € 
1.5 billion. 
Looking at the geographical distribution of demand for works to be executed in PPP, Lombardy is confirmed in 
the ranking by number of regional competitions, with 174 interventions (16% of the national total). Follow, with 
wide separation, Emilia Romagna with 102 contracts and then the Campania with 100 contracts. The regional 
average of 54 interventions, is exceeded by nine regions out of 20 total (Figure 9 and Figure 10). 
On the top list for business volume ranks Campania with 989 million, followed by a minimum separation from 
Lombardy with 929 million euro. Together, the two regions have held 61% of the national volume of business, but 
these values are due to the two big races over 500 million held by Anas Spa followed: 
- Sicilia, with 311 million; 
- Lazio, with 276 million; 
- Emilia Romagna, with 157 million; 
- Friuli Venezia Giulia, with 140 million. 
The remained regions do not exceed 65 million euro. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In 1994 and 1998 the Merloni law set the framework for using private sector contractors, only later a special 
PPP taskforce, UTFP, was created and its powers were reinforced in 2001. In addition to the administrative delay 
in defining the set of rules for the PPP, there are a lot of reasons that make the application and use of PPP less 
effective and efficient in Italy than in other countries. 
In particular, with regard to the administrative issues, three main factors contribute to slow down the use of 
PPP: 1) the complexity of the administrative procedures and the distortions of competition due to the so-called 
“right of pre-emption”, which used to discouraged firms to participate to biddings; 2) the difficulty of regulating 
through contracts a proper allocation of risks, due to the “civil law” system in force in Italy; 3) the 
high administrative risk characterizing the adjudication procedures (Iossa and Antellini Russo, 2008). 
With regard to the financial aspects, the main critical issue is the source of funding used for Italian PPP 
projects. The funding of PPP projects in Italy is generally granted by banks and rarely provided by capital market, 
by selling bonds or shares to investors (Etro, 2007). Using such a kind of funding gives disadvantages in 
comparison with other countries: the interest rate is about 10 - 11%, while in UK, for instance, the required spread 
on the risk-free rate is about 0,75 - 1% (Iossa and Antellini Russo, 2008). In addition to this, Italian banks tend to 
ask for traditional guarantees for the financing (Bentivogli et al., 2008) and this situation has been exacerbated by 
the recent financial crisis: nowadays, banks require greater spreads, reduced leverage and more guarantees in order 
to grant a loan. In addition to this, the mean duration of the loan was reduced (UTFP, 2010). 
Finally, as for the Italian Government’s influence on the use of PPP there are still some shortcomings in the 
legislative regulation that does not allow the PPP to be used in an effective way. First of all, Italian law does not 
prescribe the estimation of Value for Money before the approval of a PPP project. Nowadays, the evaluation of the 
feasibility of a PPP project is simply based on the “Economic-Financial Plan” which is made by the private 
sponsor. Secondly, in Italy the SPV is normally formed by local or national Governments and/or public companies 
(Bentivogli et al., 2008), as a consequence the level of commitment of the private sector is quite minimized.  
As noted above, the PPP operations are complex, in which there are elements traditionally managed separately, 
such as the design, construction, management. For this reason, their organization and management requires the 
development of specific assessment, economic and financial skills, to be integrated in technical and planning skills 
(engineering, architectural and plant) and managerial skills. 
In addition, we have to consider the legal skills, necessary for the management of contracts, for the selection of 
the private operator and negotiation, management and renegotiation of the contract. Project management is the glue 
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of these skills, the element that makes it possible to realize a certain investments that generate economic and social 
value. 
A more sustainable use of PPP for the construction of public investments urgently requires some investment of 
managerial, such as: 
• improving the skills of project management and economic and financial, which support the government 
intend to start PPP operations; 
• the launch of PPPs subject to assessments of feasibility, affordability and sustainability; 
• the provision of appropriate documentation, including a specification of requirements and associated 
services required, especially with regard to quality standards; 
• prediction of profitability, such as NPV and IRR for the evaluation of offers (especially with reference to 
the PF); 
• the inclusion in the notice or in the contract of the risk matrix, in order to promote an efficient allocation 
of risk. 
With regard to the legal system, it is necessary a greater awareness of the financial instrument and the 
establishment of a system of procedures that do not induce behavior distortions in the system, such as the use of 
PPPs to overcome the constraints of public finance. 
As regards the private system, it is essential a greater attention to the real needs of the entity and a largest 
customization of operations, which sometimes represent the real replications of structures finance inefficient, 
aimed only to generate high yields and safe. 
With regard to the returns of operations, we should highlight the need for careful evaluation systems more 
efficient by government, especially at this time in history when Great attention is devoted to the recovery of the 
Italian economy, including through infrastructure investment. The urgent need for infrastructure projects shall not 
reduce the focus on efficiency of operations, which must be aligned with the benchmark, in order to avoid the cost 
of the investment affects excessively on public budgets or users of the services. 
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